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When Good Value Chains Go Bad:
The Economics of Indirect Liability
for Copyright Infringement*
by
RICHARD J. GILBERT** and MICHAEL L. KATz***
Introduction
The extensive use of digital information storage (e.g., disk drives,
CDs, and DVDs) and the growth of digital telecommunications
networks (e.g., the Internet) have created new opportunities for
producers of creative works to distribute their output to consumers at
low cost. Equally important, these developments have also lowered
the cost of making and distributing high-quality copies of creative
works without the owners' knowledge or consent. Napster and other
Internet-based file-sharing services are prominent examples. These
file-sharing services offer musicians a low-cost means to distribute
their works to a mass audience, but they also allow users to copy and
exchange copyrighted material easily without compensating the
owners.
Digital copying and distribution raise new copyright issues and
bring other issues, such as the reach of prohibitions on contributory
infringement, to the forefront. An important question for the digital
economy is whether the providers of technologies and services that
facilitate illegal copying should themselves be found to violate
copyright law. This issue is an instance of a more general question.
One might think of infringement as a single entity's taking a single
*This Article is an expansion of remarks delivered at Consumers in the Digital Age:
Perspectives on the Intersection of Law, Technological Innovation, and Consumer
Protection, a Symposium held at University of California, Hastings College of the Law on
February 10, 2001. We would like to thank the conference organizers for their hospitality
and encouragement. We would also like to thank Stacey Dogan, Mark Lemley, and
Pamela Samuelson for helpful discussions.
** Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley.
*** Edward J. and Mollie Arnold Professor of Business Administration, University of
California, Berkeley.
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action to consume a copy of a protected work. In practice, many
different activities, such as copy creation, copy distribution, and copy
playback, are undertaken to make consumption of an infringing copy
possible. Moreover, different activities may be undertaken by
different economic agents. It is useful to view the collection of
activities and services that facilitate infringement as a "value chain."
A fundamental question for copyright policy is the choice of stage or
stages in the value chain at which to enforce a prohibition on
infringing activities.' The Digital Millennium Copyright Act has
brought this question to the fore with its prohibition of manufacturing
or trafficking in any technology that is aimed at circumventing
technological measures that would otherwise control access to, or
protect a right of, a copyrighted work.2 Rather than attacking the
creation and consumption of illegal copies, this measure attacks the
creation and distribution of technologies that enable the making and
consumption of illegal copies.
In this Article, we present an economic framework in which to
assess the optimal stages at which to enforce copyright prohibitions.
Phrased in legal terminology, we address the economics of direct and
indirect liability for copyright infringement. In particular, we
consider the circumstances under which holding parties responsible
for contributory or vicarious infringement promotes economic
efficiency.3 There would be no need for a doctrine of contributory
infringement or vicarious liability if it were possible to identify direct
infringers without significant expenditures of resources. Often this is
not possible; thus, the social choice is between identifying direct
infringers at large costs and taking actions against activities at other
stages in the value chain at potentially smaller costs. A principal
danger of this approach is that activities at other stages may have
valid, non-infringing uses. The risks of deterring such valid activities
must be considered when deciding such issues as whether the use of a
VCR contributes to the infringement of broadcasters' copyrights,
whether Napster should be prevented from distributing copyrighted
1. Similar issues arise with many other illegal activities, such as committing a
homicide with a handgun. The factors we identify below would be applicable to those
situations as well.
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2) & (b)(1).
3. A party can be liable for contributory infringement if the party knowingly engages
in "personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement." Matthew Bender & Co.
v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998). Vicarious liability can occur when a
party "has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct
financial interest in such activities." Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt.,
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). Both contributory infringement and vicarious
liability are instances of indirect infringement, and our analysis does not distinguish
between them.
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music files, and whether anti-encryption technologies fall within the
reach of infringing activities.
Although our focus is on this one dimension of copyright
enforcement, enforcement decisions can properly be made only
within a broader analysis of copyright policy. Hence, we first review
the economic objectives of copyright and summarize the policy's
principal components. We then present a stylized value chain for
infringing activities. Using this value chain, we develop a set of
factors with which to assess the desirability of enforcement at each
stage of the chain. We conclude by applying this multi-factor
framework to two hypothetical examples. One example concerns a
service that facilitates the low-cost exchange of copies of copyrighted
material among users. The other example concerns a technology that
allows users to defeat electronic protection of digital information.
These examples roughly correspond to Napster's file sharing service
and the DeCSS software that defeats the DVD encryption scheme.
However, these examples should be viewed only as suggestive.
I. Background
To determine optimal enforcement, one must place enforcement
decisions within the broader context of overall copyright policy, both
its objectives and its full set of instruments.
A. Objectives
Intellectual property rights policy generally seeks to promote the
creation and dissemination of creative works. From an economic
perspective, intellectual property protection should provide rewards
that generate appropriate levels of investment in creative activity,
taking into account its benefits and costs.4 Ideally, the property right
should be structured to minimize the social cost incurred for each
dollar of incentive that the right provides.5 There are three broad
classes of costs associated with intellectual property rights. First,
there are administrative costs of creating, maintaining, and enforcing a
policy. Second, there are static efficiency losses that arise when
intellectual property protection limits the efficient distribution of the
4. Without denying their importance, our framework does not consider "rights" such
as free speech a special factor. While these can be examined in a utilitarian framework,
there is a practical schism between those who base copyright on authors' and users' moral
rights and those who argue for copyright protection to promote efficient creation and
distribution of creative works. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY:
FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (1994).
5. For economic analyses, see, e.g., Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent
Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990), and Paul Klemperer, How Broad
Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113 (1990).
creative work. Because intellectual property typically has very low
costs of reproduction and distribution (i.e., low marginal costs), static
efficiency is maximized by the intellectual property's widespread
dissemination. However, to the extent that intellectual property
policy and market constraints allow, a private rights-holder may
restrict dissemination of its work as a consequence of exercising
market power in the pursuit of profits.6 This fact does not, however,
imply that stronger intellectual property rights give rise to greater
static efficiency losses. Intellectual property rights can promote
dissemination of protected works-even during the life of the
protection-by making licensing possible. For example, in the
absence of copyright protection, a software writer might rely on
secrecy to protect her intellectual property, while with intellectual
property protection she might choose to license the code to others.7
The third costs are those associated with dynamic efficiency
losses. Strong intellectual property protection encourages investment
in the creation of new works. However, the creation of new works
often draws on past works, such as the use of a plot concept in a work
of fiction, computer algorithms in a new type of software, or samples
of previously recorded music in a rap song. The assignment of
intellectual property rights to an initial innovation can generate social
losses by discouraging follow-on innovation, either because the
follow-on innovator cannot reach an agreement with the original
innovator or because the need to make payments to the original
innovator lowers the incentive to create follow-on works.8
The analysis of efficiency losses resulting from intellectual
property protection typically is framed in terms of the inefficiencies
that protection generates within a market for the protected property
or for subsequent innovations (or creative expression) that make use
of the protected property. For example, one might examine whether
parody should be granted status as fair use to encourage the efficient
6. For a brief discussion concerning the sources of static efficiency losses, see
generally Michael L. Katz, Joint Ventures as a Means of Assembling Complementary Inputs, 4
GROUP DECISION & NEGOTIATION 383 (1995).
7. See generally Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, The Structure of Licensing
Contracts, 48 J. INDUST. ECON. 103 (2000) (presenting results of a study showing that
industries with weaker intellectual property protection tend to have less licensing).
Licensing also can have efficiency benefits by avoiding redundant investments that may be
required to escape infringement. See generally Nancy T. Gallini & Ralph A. Winter,
Licensing in the Theory of Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 237 (1985).
8. For discussions about the effects of intellectual property rights on initial and
follow-on innovation, see generally Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and
Cumulative Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 34 (1995), Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997), and Suzanne
Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law,
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
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creation of follow-on work. However, indirect liability for
infringement can generate social costs in markets that are unrelated
to the protected property. The threat of punishment for indirect
infringement can discourage or distort activities in markets other than
the market in which direct infringement may occur. For example,
broad prohibitions on the exchange of copyrighted files on the
Internet could affect activities with substantial non-infringing uses,
such as Internet search engines, which may be used to locate illegal
copies of protected works.
B. Dimensions of Copyright Policy
An intellectual property regime can be viewed as having four
broad components:
(1) The height of the initial requirements for obtaining the property rights.
In the case of copyright, the requirements are set quite low.
Copyright requires only an element of creativity. In contrast to
patent law, there is no requirement that the work be non-obvious or
useful.9
(2) The length of the rights obtained.
The length is simply the time period over which the rights-holder
possesses the bundle of protected rights associated with the particular
type of intellectual property. Generally, works created after 1977
receive copyright protection for the life of the author plus 70 years.10
For works made for hire, the copyright term is 95 years from the year
of its first publication, or 120 years from the year of its creation,
whichever expires first." This is much longer than the duration of
patent protection, which is 20 years from the date at which a patent
application is filed.'2 The duration of copyright protection is also long
relative to the likely time required for others to create follow-on
works that are inspired or otherwise facilitated by the original
creation.
(3) The breadth of the rights obtained.
The breadth is more complex and has several dimensions,
including:
9. To gain patent protection, an invention must be novel, non-obvious, and useful.
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03. Copyright protection applies to original works of
authorship embodied in a tangible medium of expression. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102.
10. Id § 302(a).
11. Id § 302(c).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 154.
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(a) The acts that violate one or more of the enumerated exclusive
rights of a copyright owner.
The unauthorized reproduction, adaptation, distribution, public
display, or public performance of copyrighted material could violate
the copyright laws.13 For example, copyright policy must determine
whether browsing a shelf of books, downloading a document from the
Internet, reading software into a computer's ROM, or taping a video
broadcast for home viewing constitute illegal copying.
(b) The amount or degree of duplication that is necessary to create a
copy.
The enforcement of any policy protecting intellectual property
rights must explicitly or implicitly set thresholds for what constitutes a
copy. The extent of duplication has both qualitative and quantitative
dimensions, and both dimensions can serve as the basis of
economically useful tests.14 With respect to quantitative tests for
copyright infringement, limits on the degree of copying can be
expressed in both relative and absolute terms. In practice, both types
of limits are needed. Used alone, even a low percentage ceiling could
allow a large amount of copying from a single work (e.g., one percent
of a million lines of computer code is 10,000 lines). Used alone, an
absolute limit would also be inadequate. For example, unless it were
set at under seventeen syllables, an absolute ceiling would allow
complete replication of haikus. Turning to qualitative tests, policy
must explicitly or implicitly address how close a follow-on work can
be in terms of its structure, sequence, and organization in comparison
to a copyrighted work before the follow-on work is considered to be
an infringing copy of the original.
(c) Fair use and other exceptions.
An intellectual property regime may allow for the consumption
of otherwise unauthorized copies. For example, the copyright statute
in the U.S. allows for fair use and places several other restrictions on
the ability of the copyright holder to limit use of her works.'
5
13. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
14. The courts have also recognized the value of both qualitative and quantitative tests
in assessing whether copyright infringement has occurred. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
15. Section 107 of the Copyright Act, in part, provides that "the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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(4) The available tools for enforcement.
Enforcement tools include remedies (e.g., monetary damages or
equitable relief), as well as specification of the parties against whom
enforcement actions can be taken.
Our focus is on the very last policy dimension: At what stage in a
value chain should one enforce a claim of copyright infringement?
Before answering this question, we address its relationship to the
overall design of the copyright policy.
C. Relationship Between Enforcement and Other Dimensions
The answer to the question of the appropriate stage at which to
attack copyright infringement depends on the other dimensions of
copyright policy. If other parts of the policy are non-optimally set,
then in theory one might want to distort enforcement activities as a
corrective mechanism. For example, if length and breadth were
excessive, one might want to raise private enforcement costs to
discourage enforcement. We will ignore such possibilities and assume
that other parts of the policy are set optimally. This approach reflects
the view that copyright policy should be constructed as a whole,
rather than on a piecemeal basis. Notwithstanding this fact, we limit
our discussion to the enforcement aspect of copyright policy.
The stage at which to enforce prohibitions also depends critically
on other dimensions of enforcement. For example, one of the factors
discussed in the next section is the cost of identifying violators. The
importance of this factor depends, in part, on the remedies available.
If the only remedy is that parties are ordered to do no more than
cease and desist, one would have to be able to detect all violators,
making detection and conviction costs a critical factor. This factor is
much less important if large fines are feasible. The reason is the
following. The risk of getting caught and facing a large penalty can be
sufficient to deter copying even if the probability of being punished is
very low. Thus, even if it would be extremely costly to identify
substantial numbers of infringers, a very small threat of conviction
(which could be cheaply attained) coupled with a very large penalty
for infringement might be sufficient to deter much illegal copying.16
Another exception allows for copies to be made by libraries for certain purposes and
uses. Id. § 108. Furthermore, the Copyright Act exempts certain performances of
copyrighted works. Id. § 111.
16. The problem with large penalties is that, notwithstanding the advice of economists,
such penalties are viewed as having socially unacceptable consequences, particularly when
infringement is unintentional. High penalties may also deter juries from convicting
defendants even when they are "clearly" guilty, which reduces the deterrence value of the
penalties. For an early analysis of this issue, see Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 183-85 (1968).
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The accuracy of enforcement mechanisms can also affect the
appropriate weights to apply to various factors. "Sloppy"
enforcement (meaning errors in the detection and conviction of
infringers) both weakens deterrence and raises the likelihood that
non-infringing activities will be discouraged.17 Thus, the accuracy of
enforcement may determine the weight that should be given to those
factors, discussed infra Part III.C. to F., that attempt to account for
the effects on non-infringing activities in determining the optimal
stage for copyright enforcement.
H. The Infringing Value Chain
In order to discuss the appropriate level for enforcement to block
or deter infringement, one must have a notion of infringement. We
take as a primitive the existence of an illegal activity, the consumption
of a copy of a protected work without permission. By permission we
mean either an explicit or implicit license, or a statutory fair use right.
By consumption, we mean use of a copy in some way that provides
utility to the user. Thus, for example, making a backup copy can be a
form of consumption, even if it never actually is played or read,
because it provides insurance to the user.
In practice, many different activities are undertaken to enable
the consumption of a copy without permission. We will refer to this
collection of activities as an infringing value chain. The question we
address is at what stages in the infringing value chain should liability
attach for activities that ultimately lead to infringing a copyright.
Figure 1 offers a stylized value chain for copying. The stages in the
value chain are:
* Enabling technology: This is the combination of hardware and
software that provides the capability to directly infringe a
copyrighted work. Examples include a Xerox copier, a CD
burner, or a video cassette recorder.
* Copy creation: The creation of the copy is distinct from the
technology involved in making the copy. This stage of the value
chain is undertaken by the parties who physically make copies.
* Distribution: Once a copy is made, it is distributed to a potential
user. In the case of home taping of a CD for personal use, the
distribution stage is trivial. Distribution of thousands or millions
of copies over the Internet obviously is a much greater
17. Deterrence is an increasing function of the difference between the expected
punishment conditional on infringing and not infringing a copyright. Thus enforcement
errors, which punish non-infringing activities, weaken deterrence. Furthermore, these
errors increase the costs of non-infringing activities and therefore lower the return from
investing in these activities.
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enterprise. 8 The distribution stage involves the technology for
distributing the copy and the channels for delivery of the copy to
potential consumers.
" Publicizing: The publicizing of the copy includes all of the
activities that alert potential consumers to the existence of the
copy. Publicizing can take place through word of mouth, or
other means, such as the provision of links on an Internet site to
another site where an infringing copy or technology can be
found. Similarly, a search engine can publicize the existence of
an infringing copy to the extent that it facilitates access to the
copy. By its interconnected nature, the World Wide Web raises
a host of issues concerning what is considered to be publicizing
the availability of infringing copies of protected works.
* Consumption: The final stage in the copying value chain is the
actual consumption of the copy. As discussed above,
consumption can include reading or browsing a hard or digital
copy, loading software into a computer, making backup copies,
or recording programming for viewing at a different time.
While it is useful to conceptualize the problem in terms of a
single value chain for copying, one can also break down each of the
stages in this aggregate chain into component value chains. For
example, we discuss below the value chain for one enabling
technology-circumvention technology. 19 Moreover, economists also
refer to the notion of a value net, which comprises interlinking value
chains of complementary activities. The value chain comprising the
stages necessary to create a copyrighted work, for example, clearly is
complementary to the value chain for making a copy.20 The degree to
which it is necessary to examine these related value chains explicitly
varies with the specifics of the case being examined.
While it is useful to frame the discussion in terms of finding the
best stage at which to enforce a copyright, the optimal enforcement
policy, in fact, may attack several stages simultaneously. Whether it is
preferable to enforce prohibitions at one level or many depends on
the nature of the enforcement costs. A central question is whether
enforcement costs at a given stage exhibit increasing or decreasing
returns to scale. If enforcement costs at each stage exhibit decreasing
returns to scale, the optimal enforcement policy is very likely to call
for some expenditure on enforcement at every stage. If a particular
stage in the chain exhibits increasing returns to scale, the optimal
18. It is irrelevant for our purposes whether a copy is said to be made before or after
the information is transmitted over the Internet for distribution.
19. One example would be a technology that decrypts an encrypted computer file and
thus allows a party to make a readable or usable copy.
20. Alternatively, one could think of this complementary value chain as an expansion
of the enabling technology stage of the copying value chain.
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enforcement policy is likely to be "all or nothing" at that stage
(although this does not rule out the possibility that optimal
enforcement could include expenditures at other stages of the value
chain as well). Fixed costs of detection and prosecution may lead to
increasing returns to scale. If it is relatively easy to detect some
infringers, but not others, this pattern may lead to decreasing returns
to scale (i.e., increasing marginal costs of enforcement at a given
stage). In addition, the different ways in which people react to small
and large probabilities of detection may affect whether enforcement
involves increasing or decreasing returns to scale.21
II. Factors to Consider in Assessing the Stage at Which to
Enforce Copyright
Enforcement activities should be designed to be effective while
taking into account all three types of social costs, discussed supra Part
II.C.: the administrative costs, the static efficiency losses, and the
dynamic efficiency losses. There are several factors to consider in
determining the optimal stage in the value net at which to enforce a
copyright:
A. Ease with which enforcement authorities can observe and police
activities at various stages in the infringing value chain.22
This factor is relevant to the assessment of likely administrative
costs-both the costs of detecting direct infringement and the costs of
bringing enforcement actions against those who are known to
infringe. All else equal, the greater the number of parties engaged in
the activity, the higher the costs of detection and prosecution would
be. Detection costs will also depend on whether the infringing parties
act publicly (e.g., publicize a central server offering infringing copies
for downloading) or privately (e.g., someone taping a copyrighted CD
at home to sell to a friend).
B. Existence of substitutes in the infringing value chain.
If lots of agents do the same thing, it is pointless to stop just one.
Figure 2 illustrates such a situation with two stylized value chains.
The letters A, B, and C refer to stages in the infringing value chain,
21. Consider, for instance, the effects of an enforcement regime with only a very small
chance of getting caught and punished. Would consumers ignore the small chance of
being punished (so-called threshold effects) or would they put too much weight on this
outcome in deciding whether to infringe? The answer to this question obviously affects
whether this type of enforcement regime will be effective. Studies show that individuals
often put too much emphasis on low-probability events in choosing courses of action.
22. Enforcement authorities include relevant government agencies as well as the
rights-holders themselves when they bring infringing activities to a court's attention.
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and the subscripts refer to alternative technologies or activities at
each stage. If enforcement takes place at stage A, there would be
little benefit from stopping A 1 alone if A 2 is a good substitute. To
deter infringement, it is necessary to deter most or all of the
infringing substitutes (both A1 and A2 in this example), either by
actual prosecution or by creating an expectation of sufficiently harsh
punishment relative to the odds of prosecution and conviction.
Because it is necessary to block all or most of the substitutes at a
given stage, one must analyze the costs of blocking the substitutes in
their totality and examine each substitute to determine if it is part of a
non-infringing value chain. The effects on any affected non-infringing
value chains are addressed by the next three factors.
C. Total economic value of the affected non-infringing value chains.
Activities such as A2, B1, and C3 in Figure 2 are elements of both
infringing and non-infringing value chains. For example, a CD burner
can be used to copy copyrighted CDs (a potentially infringing
activity) or to store a database created by the user (a non-infringing
activity). The threat of punishment for indirect infringement against
CD burner manufacturers might discourage the production and sale
of burners that would have been used for the otherwise non-
infringing activities. Thus, all else equal, copyright enforcement costs
are minimized by enforcement at the stage in the infringing value
chain that has the lowest total economic value in the affected non-
infringing value chains.23
Consideration of the total economic value raises the issue of
whether to take into account only the current value of the associated
non-infringing activities, or also to include the potential future values
in the calculus. A further issue is whether to consider potential
positive technological spillovers. For example, to the extent it can be
measured, one should account for the possibility that the
development of a technology to make and distribute illegal copies
contributes to the development of better means for distributing non-
infringing material. Lastly, it is important to recognize that the
producers' profits are not sufficient measures of the value of
economic activity because they fail to account for consumer benefits.
Total surplus, the sum of the producers' profits and the consumers'
23. An optimal copyright regime should also compare the losses due to the blocking of
non-infringing activities with the efficiency losses that would be incurred by allowing
infringement to continue. If the former losses are larger than the latter, then efficiency is
maximized by not enforcing the copyright at any stage. Note that calculation of the losses
due to the blocking of non-infringing activities must also take into account the substitution
and bargaining factors discussed infra.
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surplus (i.e., the net of gross consumption benefits minus consumer
payments) is a more appropriate measure.24
D. Existence of substitutes in the affected non-infringing value chains.
This factor speaks to the efficiency losses from copyright
enforcement. The social costs from enjoining an activity at a
particular stage in an infringing value chain are relatively low if there
are close substitutes for that activity in the non-infringing value
chains. Referring back to Figure 2, suppose that copyright
enforcement attacks stage B in the infringing value chain. There is
only one activity (B,) at this stage, and shutting down this activity
stops the entire infringing value chain. The social cost of this action is
low when the alternative activities B2 and B3 in the corresponding
stage of the non-infringing value chain are close substitutes for B1 in
the non-infringing value chain. Therefore, the non-infringing activity
could continue at little additional cost. In contrast, shutting down A1
and A 2 to stop infringement would also shut down the non-infringing
value chain. Therefore, enforcement at stage A of the infringing
value chain would incur the additional (and possibly large) social cost
of eliminating the non-infringing value chain.
E. Ease with which a party in a given stage can distinguish between
infringing and non-infringing uses of its services.
This factor is relevant if activities are elements of both infringing
and non-infringing value chains (such as a server that is used to
exchange files with and without the permission of the copyright-
holder). The issues raised by this factor are whether a party can
distinguish infringing from non-infringing uses, the administrative
costs of making such a distinction, and the efficiency losses that would
occur if a party is compelled to block both infringing and non-
infringing uses when it is too costly to distinguish between the two
types of activity.2 It might appear that this factor always favors
enforcement against direct infringers. However, someone
downloading an electronic file may not know whether that file is
24. In fact, if the industries supplying these producers themselves earn profits, those
profits should be included in the measure as well. The total of all of the profits of the
industry and its suppliers is known as producers' surplus.
25. The Copyright Act appears to take this factor into account in carving out
exemptions from liability for certain parties for participating in activities that have non-
infringing as well as infringing uses. For example, section 512(a) of the Copyright Act
exempts providers of transitory communications services (i.e., the on-line service
providers) when they do not initiate the communications, select or modify the content, or
determine the recipients. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). Common carriers typically do not monitor
the content of material that they transmit, and, in many cases, it would be difficult (and it
would raise privacy issues) for them to do so.
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subject to copyright protection-even if the rights-holder included a
notice in the initial format, another economic agent may have
stripped that notice from the file.
F. Economic environment for bargaining between the rights-holder and
parties at a given stage in the infringing value chain.
The fact that a rights-holder could require a party to cease
activities that directly or indirectly infringe a copyright does not mean
that the rights-holder will do so. Instead, after the copyright-holder
becomes aware of the infringing activity, the two parties may reach an
agreement that allows the infringer to continue operating. This
arrangement may take the form of an explicit license, a negotiated
settlement to litigation, or even an implicit understanding.26 The
scope and nature of the bargaining over such arrangements has
important implications for the likely efficiency effects of copyright
protection as well as the appropriate stage at which to enforce
copyright.
In situations where the parties can meet before any economic
agent has made an investment in a potentially infringing activity, the
parties are equally well informed about the situation, and transactions
costs are otherwise insubstantial, economic theory predicts that the
parties will reach a privately efficient bargain (i.e., a bargain that
maximizes their collective well-being in the sense that none of the
bargaining parties can be made better off without making at least one
of the other bargaining parties worse off). With efficient bargaining,
a party wishing to undertake otherwise infringing activities will be
allowed to do so if and only if the total economic benefits to the
bargaining parties are greater when the activity is undertaken than
when it is not. Thus, if there is a stage at which efficient bargaining
can occur, enforcement can occur at this stage without concern that
the enforcement activity will inefficiently threaten non-infringing
activities. This analysis suggests that such a stage would be an
appropriate one at which to have vigorous enforcement.2 7
26. We are ignoring legal issues concerning how the form of any such agreement at
one stage affects the ability to assert intellectual property rights at another stage.
27. A well-known economic result referred to as the Coase Theorem (after Ronald
Coase, a famous Chicago School Economist) at first glance suggests that the assignment of
intellectual property rights would be irrelevant in this situation because the parties could
be expected to bargain to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial assignment of
property rights. For a discussion of the economic theory known as the Coase Theorem,
see Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). However, one
must also recognize dynamic efficiency considerations. Assuming that the bargaining
takes place after the original work has been created, the assignment of property rights will
affect the economic returns enjoyed by the creator and thus will affect dynamic efficiency.
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Two notes of caution must be sounded, however. First, while the
parties might bargain to a privately efficient outcome, they will tend
to ignore the effects on third parties not involved in the negotiations.
Second, the conditions under which bargaining will be privately
efficient are very strong, and in other circumstances bargaining may
fail to lead to economically efficient outcomes. To see the
importance of these conditions, consider the launch of a hypothetical
Internet-based service that would permit downloading of a particular
living composer's music. The provider and the composer might
negotiate general licensing terms that would allow the service to
proceed without negotiating specific royalties for each work.2 8 If this
negotiation took place before the provider had committed any
resources to the project, and the parties were equally well-informed
about the economic values involved, the parties would be expected to
reach a privately efficient bargain. In other situations, the existence
of sunk costs, imperfect information, or multiple parties to a
transaction can interfere with efficient negotiations. Sunk costs
create hold-up opportunities. If the service provider had incurred
sunk hardware and software costs, the composer might recognize that
the service provider is locked in to the project. Thus, the composer
might bargain for terms that would make the service unprofitable
taking these costs into account. Asymmetric information may lead
parties strategically to distort their behavior to conceal their private
information. The result can be bargaining breakdowns, even when it
would be efficient to reach an agreement. Lastly, the presence of
multiple parties can increase transaction costs and create holdout
opportunities that can lead to inefficient outcomes. Holdout occurs
when multiple parties are needed to conclude a bargain and each
party uses its veto power in an attempt to appropriate more than its
proportional share of the gains.29
G. Availability of other enforcement tools.
Copyright-holders may have other tools, such as encryption of
protected works, that could substitute for copyright enforcement.
28. This is similar to the blanket licenses provided by ASCAP for commercial
broadcasts.
29. For a summary of the manner in which sunk costs and asymmetric information can
distort licensing decisions, see generally Michael L. Katz, Joint Ventures as a Means of
Assembling Complementary Inputs, 4 GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION 383 (1995). For
a discussion of problems that arise from bargaining transaction costs and large numbers of
rights-holders in the context of biotechnology patents, see generally Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (May 1, 1998). See also OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS
AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975) (providing a
more general discussion of transactions costs).
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When copyright-holders have effective "self-help" measures to
protect their works, there is less justification for enforcing copyright
against potential infringers and risking such enforcement activity
would deter legitimate activities. Moreover, these self-help measures
may vary by stage, which could be relevant in a multi-stage
enforcement strategy. A related issue is whether there are stages in
the infringing value chain where the activities create tools to defeat
self-help. Copyright enforcement policy should not be evaluated
from the sole perspective of a centralized agency. Rather,
enforcement should consider the entire range of private activities that
may be used to protect copyrighted works and their social costs.
Self-help measures create or strengthen a property right, which
then can promote bargaining. However, the desirability of self-help
measures also should be analyzed, using the factors previously
identified for copyright enforcement. Copyright-holders may fail to
take into account the full social effects of their self-help actions on
non-infringing activities; thus, in the absence of policy restraints,
copyright-holders may tend toward socially excessive levels of self-
help enforcement.
As Professor Stacey Dogan points out, enforcement actions
against indirect infringers entail the risk that such actions will deter
legitimate and non-infringing technological activities. 30  Dogan
examines the "staple article of commerce" doctrine, which limits the
ability of copyright holders to assert claims of contributory
infringement or vicarious liability against sellers of technologies that
may be used to infringe, but that also have "substantial non-infringing
uses."'3' The definition of "substantial" determines how the court
weighs the importance of non-infringing activities. Professor Dogan
states,
"Substantial" for purposes of [the staple item of commerce test]
should mean, at least, that the non-infringing use would alone
justify the development and distribution of the product; otherwise
the public is not being deprived of a neutral staple, but of a product
that is made possible solely by infringement. 32
We wish to make two points about Professor Dogan's insightful
analysis. Our first point is that Dogan's test can differ from an
efficiency test in two respects. For one thing, for this to be an
efficiency test, one must assume that the incremental gains derived by
30. Stacey Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony for Napster and Other
Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939 (2001).
31. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,439, 442,491-92. For a
more complete treatment of this topic, see generally Dogan, supra note 30.
32. Dogan, supra note 30, at 956-57.
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the infringing parties from their infringing activities are less than the
incremental losses suffered by the rights-holders. This assumption is
necessary so that the aggregate social contribution of the infringing
activities is negative, and thus the addition of infringing activities
cannot justify non-infringing activities that could not stand on their
own. For another thing, the fact that revenues are less than
standalone costs does not mean that standalone gross consumption
benefits are less than standalone costs. The difference arises from the
fact that a firm's revenues are less than the total gross consumption
benefits by the amount of consumer surplus 3 Thus, to be an
efficiency test, one would have to assume that consumer surplus is
zero. While the assumption that losses exceed gains is likely to be
reasonable (or the parties would bargain their way to a license), the
assumption of zero surplus is not.
Our second point is that we wish to emphasize that this risk
assessment should depend on the full set of factors we discussed
above. The social benefit from pursuit of contributory infringement
depends, inter alia, on the ability to identify and punish direct
infringers and on other tools available to copyright holders to enforce
their rights. Moreover, one must take into account the effects of
infringement on the incentive to create protected works. Allowing
infringement could result in dynamic efficiency losses that dwarf the
value of the non-infringing activity, even if the latter can cover its
standalone costs.
IV. Two Applications
In this section, we apply our multi-factor framework to two
stylized examples. The first concerns a service that facilitates the low-
cost exchange of copies of copyrighted material among users. The
second concerns a technology that allows users to defeat electronic
protection of digital information. These examples roughly
correspond to the Napster file-sharing service and the DeCSS
software that defeats the DVD encryption scheme. The reader
should recognize that these labels are only suggestive; we are not
offering full analyses of the actual fact patterns raised by either
Napster or DeCSS.
33. Recall that there may also be a wedge between a supplier's profits and producers'
surplus, which would include other suppliers' profits. See supra note 24. Moreover, in the
presence of competing suppliers, the private returns to an activity may exceed the social
returns. This case can arise when an activity gives rise to "business-stealing" effects (i.e.,
one supplier succeeds in shifting sales and profits to itself from another supplier without
creating a corresponding increase in overall social benefits).
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A. Internet Distribution of Technologically Unprotected Copyrighted
Material
Suppose that a company provides an Internet-based service that
makes it cheap and easy for end-users to make copies of copyrighted
works and exchange them among each other without the copyright
holders' consent. Napster is one example.34 However, one could
imagine a similar service for online sharing of video files or even
books that are either created in a digital format or are subsequently
digitized from their original print format. Figure 3 illustrates a value
chain corresponding to this infringing activity. The Napster-like
service is present at three stages of the value chain. It is the
technology that enables the illegal copying, it is an input into the
distribution of illegal copies, and it publicizes the existence of illegal
copies. End-users are present at two stages. They make the illegal
copies, which then are available for others who subscribe to the
service, and they consume the illegal copies. We consider the
efficient stage for copyright enforcement in this value chain, taking
into account the factors identified above in Section IV.
(1) Ease with which enforcement authorities can observe and police activities
at various stages in the infringing value chain.
The decentralized nature of the Internet, the anonymity of its
users, and the large number of potential end-users all suggest that it
would be difficult to detect and identify the specific end-users who
make and consume illegal copies. While one might obtain IP
addresses from the directory server of the file.exchange service, these
might have passed through a masking service or be associated with
multiple people. In contrast, a centralized server system that
coordinates distribution is much easier to identify. Hence with
respect to this factor, enforcement at the level of the enabling Napster
technology would be the more efficient alternative. This conclusion
depends on the particular structure of the server-based file exchange
system. For example, a program such as Gnutella does not require a
centralized server. Hence, it would be much more difficult to enjoin
the infringing activity at the level of the enabling technology. In the
alternative, it would be necessary to block creation of the software
(which is useless after the enabling technology has been created and
distributed) or block its publicizing and distribution. Distribution is
hard to stop because it too can take place on a decentralized basis.
That leaves publicizing activities.
34. Napster describes itself as "an integrated browser and communications system
provided by Napster, Inc., to enable musicians and music fans to locate bands and music
available in the MP3 music format." Napster, Copyright Policy, at
http://www.napster.comltermsl (last visited Apr. 3,2001).
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(2) Existence of substitutes in the infringing value chain.
There already are a variety of programs that allow users to
exchange files of various types, and many more are likely to appear in
the future. With respect to music files, Gnutella and other programs
facilitate file copying and exchange among end-users. However, in
the case of Gnutella, there is no central directory of available songs.
While these programs do not have user networks as large as
Napster's, they are growing, and can be expected to grow more
rapidly if Napster's ability to serve as the basis for copying and
exchanging copyrighted material without paying compensation
diminishes. Hence, this factor suggests little efficacy from copyright
enforcement aimed solely at Napster.
(3) Total economic value of the affected non-infringing value chains.
Napster and related Internet-based distribution technologies are
potentially very valuable means of distributing digital content. If it is
not practical to distinguish non-infringing from infringing uses of the
Napster technology (an issue we address in a separate factor below),
an injunction against the use of the Napster technology risks the loss
of substantial social value from non-infringing uses of Napster and
similar server-based file-sharing technologies.
(4) Existence of substitutes in the affected non-infringing value chains.
The close substitutes for the Napster technology in non-
infringing value chains are largely the same technologies that have
potentially infringing uses. Thus, the existence and quantitative
significance of these alternative technologies hinges on the related
question of identifying and distinguishing infringing from non-
infringing uses of the technology.
(5) Ease with which a party in a given stage can distinguish between
infringing and non-infringing uses of its services.
The difficulty of determining whether its services are being used
to exchange infringing copies or non-infringing copies has been
subject to vigorous dispute in the litigation against Napster brought
by several major recording companies.35 Sheer volume has been
raised as an obstacle to the feasibility of making such determinations,
but this claim appears to be a red herring given the power of servers.
An ongoing issue is whether one can effectively block the exchange of
protected works because any attempt to filter protected works must
deal with the fact that end-users may defeat copyright protection by
35. See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal.
2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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attaching different names to protected works so they do not appear in
the copyright database.
While disguising the names of song files can defeat automated
protection that scans for particular titles, such a scheme works only if
a large number of people know the altered or code name of the file so
that they can access it and make copies. The use of simple rules or
algorithms for changing file names (e.g., pig latin or changing "to"
and "too" to "2") allows the easy dissemination of information that
applies to a large number of files. Of course, a computer scanning for
infringing files could be programmed to implement these rules as
well, leading to an ongoing game of cat and mouse, where users
continually adopt new algorithms in attempts to stay ahead of the
automated filter. The critical factor then becomes whether users can
update their conventions faster than the filter can incorporate them.
Presumably this is one reason that the recording companies alleged
that Napster allows its electronic bulletin boards to be used to
disseminate information on renaming conventions.3 6 Concern about
the effectiveness of filters is also the reason for plaintiffs' arguing that
Napster should pursue other means of blocking copyrighted materials
from its service that are not so easily defeated by users; such means
include allowing the listing of only those files that have been
affirmatively authorized, or identifying files through means that users
cannot easily alter.37
An alternative to indirect liability would be to hold end-users
responsible for direct infringement. However, even end-users
encounter difficulties distinguishing infringing from non-infringing
copies because an electronic music file may come with no copyright
notice. Of course, one could envision a server with a copyright
database that users could access to determine whether a given song is
protected. However, the difficulties and the costs of dealing with
name changes and querying a copyright server on a consumer-by-
consumer, song-by-song basis suggest that the directory server (e.g.,
the Napster server) might be a more appropriate place to enforce
copyright.
(6) Economic environment for bargaining between the rights-holder and
parties at a given stage in the infringing value chain.
Napster has been bargaining with major record companies in an
attempt to settle their litigation. The fact that this bargaining involves
a small number of sophisticated parties suggests that the bargaining
36. See Plaintiffs Report on Napster's Non-Compliance with Modified Preliminary
Injunctions, Case No. MDL 00 1369 MHP, United States District Court, Northern District
of California, Mar. 27,2001 at § II.A.5.
37. See id. at §§ II.B-E.
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should tend to be efficient and that a policy of placing indirect
liability at this stage would also be efficient, subject to the earlier
caveat about the failure to account for consumer surplus 8
(7) Availability of other enforcement tools.
Availability of "self-help" measures to protect copyright works
appears limited in the case of server-based technologies such as
Napster. Copyright holders could encrypt their music to make them
unavailable to end-users who have not subscribed to a copyright-
protection service that provides the encryption key. However, such
encryption tools would have to be compatible with the installed base
of music players (such as MP3 players). The need for this
compatibility suggests that encryption is not a practical solution to
enforce copyrights.
This analysis suggests that copyright holders should pursue
remedies against both end-users and Napster.3 9 It is notable that the
record companies have not pursued the former. Scale economies in
copyright enforcement do not appear so large as to exclude the
simultaneous pursuit of end-users as well as Napster. One possibility
is that the probability of detection would be so low that the resulting
penalties needed for deterrence are larger than allowed under present
law. An alternative, and we believe a plausible explanation, is that
the record companies do not want to antagonize their customers.
This raises the issue of whether copyright policy should respect this
marketing concern, or whether it should deny remedies to copyright
holders that refuse to pursue end-users where possible.
B. Creation and Distribution of Circumvention Technologies
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act extends copyright
enforcement to the manufacture and trafficking of technologies that
defeat access controls or technological measures that protect a
copyrighted work. In particular, it makes it unlawful to
38. To date, settlement talks with most of the companies have not borne fruit.
However, music companies have announced various plans to create Internet distribution
channels for their output, and several major companies recently stated that they would
make their platform available to Napster if it meets copyright and security concerns. See
CNNFN, RealNetworks' E-music Bid: Media Player Software Maker Confirms Launch of
Online Subscription Service (Apr. 2, 2001), at http:llcnnfn.cnn.com/2001041021
technology/realnetworks/index.htm.
39. Thus, our analysis is supportive of the appellate court's opinion that Napster may
be found secondarily liable for direct copyright infringement under contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5446, at *44, *51.
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manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or
part thereof, that-
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use
other than to circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title;
or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert
with that person with that person's knowledge for use in
circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title °
This section applies to technologies that block access to
protected works, such as a password mechanism for a website that
offers copyrighted content to subscribers.41 A parallel section applies
to means of circumventing "a technological measure that effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner."42 This section is intended to
protect against the circumvention of technologies such as those that
block unauthorized copying of protected material. 43 The Content
Scramble System ("CSS"), which is used to block the unauthorized
copying and distribution of the content of DVDs storing prerecorded
movies, is one example of this type of technology.44 DeCSS is a
program that cracks the CSS system and has been subject of litigation
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
We can apply our factors to evaluate the economic efficiency of
prohibitions against technologies such as DeCSS that circumvent
copyright protection. In doing so, it is helpful to consider a value
chain for the circumventing technology itself. As shown in Figure 4,
the value chain for a technology that circumvents copyright
protection "nests" with the value chain for copyright infringement
because the circumvention technology is an element in the chain of
activities leading to the consumption of an illegal copy of a
copyrighted work.
The stages in the value chain for copyright circumvention are:
40. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
41. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 11-12 (1998).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1).
43. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 11-12.
44. CSS is a combination of encryption/decryption technology and an associated
licensing program that is intended to prevent: (a) the unauthorized copying and
distribution of protected video DVDs; and (b) the viewing for a DVD designated for one
region of the world in a different region. See generally Dean S. Marks & Bruce H.
Turnbull, Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection of Technology, Law and
Commercial Licenses, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 198 (2000).
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* Enabling technology: The combination of hardware and
software that provides the capability to circumvent copyright
protection.
* Distribution: This is the technology for distributing copies of the
circumventing technology and the channels in which the copies
are delivered to potential users.
* Publicizing: Publicizing includes all of the activities that alert
potential users to the existence of the circumventing technology.
Notice that the copy creation and consumption stages of the
copying value chain are not elements in the value chain for copyright
circumvention because unlawful circumvention does not require the
creation or consumption of an illegal copy.
We now apply each of our factors in turn:
(1) Ease with which enforcement authorities can observe and police activities
at various stages in the infringing value chain.
Detection of the use of software such as DeCSS to circumvent
copyright protection is extremely difficult. Use of such technologies
literally takes place in the privacy of one's own home, and it is
difficult to distinguish use of the software to crack encryption from
inspection of the software for other reasons. Even if it were possible
to identify copyrighted material whose encryption is disabled, it
would be difficult to determine whether the end-user is the same
person who actually circumvented the encryption. Very likely, it is
much easier to detect parties that publicize or distribute DeCSS than
it is to find individuals who are using the program to crack DVD
codes. This fact supports the argument in favor of enforcement
against those who publicize or distribute the circumvention
technology, rather than against those who actually use the
technology.
Another way of framing this issue is to ask whether enforcement
could better be undertaken in the primary value chain of the copying
itself. An important factor in making this assessment is whether the
activities in the copying value chain would be more or less readily
identifiable than the distribution and publicizing of the circumvention
technology. In this regard, circumvention technologies aimed at
defeating access controls for broadcast materials (e.g., encrypted
cable and satellite television signals) are particularly troubling. The
reason is that individuals possessing the circumvention technology
may be able to make infringing copies in private for personal
consumption, making it very difficult for enforcement authorities to
observe the creation, distribution, and consumption of the infringing
copies. Moreover, there would be no need to publicize infringing
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copies themselves; only the means of creating them would have to be
promoted. Materials that are widely rented on a per-use basis (e.g.,
movies on DVDs) may present similar conditions.
(2) Existence of substitutes in the infringing value chain.
We are unaware of any other programs that allow this type of
cracking. It is conceivable that other technologies could be created
that would accomplish the same end. However, at present, it is
unlikely that a prohibition against the use of DeCSS would permit
end-users to substitute another technology to circumvent DVD
encryption. This fact suggests the desirability of enforcement against
DeCSS to protect the holders of copyrighted material on DVDs.
(3) Total economic value of the affected non-infringing value chains.
With the exception of allowing fair use (an issue to which we will
turn momentarily), it appears to us as unlikely that technologies such
as DeCSS have substantial uses in non-infringing value chains. The
primary use of DeCSS is to defeat copyright protection. The
technology could be useful as a teaching example about software
encryption, and it is conceivable that the technology could have
spillover benefits for the development of new software algorithms.
(4) Existence of substitutes in the affected non-infringing value chains.
Here, the principal issue appears to be what one defines as a
non-infringing use. A non-infringing use of the DeCSS technology is
a use that does not involve manufacture, import, or offer of the
technology to circumvent copyright protection.45 Inspection of the
code in a teaching environment is a non-infringing use, and there is
the risk that a prohibition against distributing and publicizing DeCSS
also would inhibit educational activities related to DeCSS. These
activities include the study of the DeCSS code to determine whether
it offers insights for the science and application of encryption
methods. However, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides
an explicit exemption for these activities. 46 A different teaching
activity is use of the DeCSS code-and Internet links to websites that
refer to DeCSS-to study the issues raised by distribution and
publicizing of a copyright circumvention technology. While
restrictions of this type of activity may have important ramifications
for free speech, it is not clear that one has to see the DeCSS code
itself to study the issues that its distribution and publicizing raise. In
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
46. Section 1201(g) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act allows the circumvention
of access control measures for the purpose of encryption research. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g).
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this respect, it would appear that there are viable substitutes for
technologies such as DeCSS in non-infringing value chains.
A more substantial objection to enforcement actions against
DeCSS is that this program is essential to enable fair use.47 Professors
Benkler and Lessig assert:
As applied to prohibit DeCSS, the antidevice provision of the
[Digital Millenium Copyright Act] violates the First Amendment.
CSS is a device that makes fair and otherwise privileged uses of
digitized materials practically impossible. Prohibiting its
circumvention in the absolute way that the antidevice provision...
does, would render these materials practically unavailable to the
vast majority of users who are not computer geeks.48
The argument is that, while CSS-encrypted DVDs can be viewed,
they cannot be directly incorporated into other works, such as
multimedia educational presentations, in ways that would otherwise
constitute fair use. In terms of our framework, the key assessments
are the total economic value of blocked fair use (which it treated by
our previous factor) and whether an authorized viewing combined
with some other form of summary or reproduction is a good
substitute for access to, and manipulation of, a decrypted version of
the file.
(5) Ease with which a party in a given stage can distinguish between
infringing or non-infringing uses of its services.
Parties that participate in the distribution and publicizing of
technologies such as DeCSS include Internet service providers and
sponsors of general-purpose search engines. Likely, it is very costly
for such parties to determine whether distributing and publicizing
technologies such as DeCSS is for circumventing copyright protection
or for non-infringing uses such as teaching. As for sponsors of
websites or search engines who post links to websites that feature
DeCSS, they would have to check the specific content of websites to
see if they discussed DeCSS, provided a copy of it, or pointed a user
47. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Yochai Benkler & Lawrence Lessig in
Support of Appellant at 21; Universal v. Reimerdes; Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual
Property Law Professors in Support of Defendants-Appellants.
48. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Yochai Benkler & Lawrence Lessig in
Support of Appellant at 21; Universal v. Reimerdes. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of Defendants-Appellants at § II.C
(arguing that the anti-device provisions prevent fair use of underlying copyrighted works
when that use requires exact copying, and the provisions allow the use of access
technologies to deny the public the ability to copy a work after its copyright has expired).
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to a means of obtaining a copy. This appears to be the critical issue in
this fact pattern.49
(6) Economic environment for bargaining between the rights-holder and
parties at a given stage in the infringing value chain.
Presumably one could have had bargaining between the creator
of DeCSS and representatives of the DVD standard. It strikes us as
very unlikely that there would have been gains from trade that would
have led to an agreement to allow DeCSS to escape challenge. 50
Bargaining might also take place between CSS representatives and
the Internet search engines to remove links to sites offering DeCSS
downloads. However, bargaining to exclude links to third parties
raises troubling competitive issues.
(7) Availability of other enforcement tools.
DeCSS is designed to defeat one of the principal forms of self-
help-the encryption of DVDs. A new encryption scheme is not a
practical form of self-help because the need for standards and
compatibility with players makes it impractical for manufacturers to
keep changing the encryption scheme.
Some have expressed concern that the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act has empowered the doctrine of indirect copyright
infringement in potentially harmful ways.5' Economic analysis can
shed light on these issues. This analysis indicates that an efficient
approach to copyright enforcement has to consider the costs and
benefits of enforcement at each stage of an infringing value chain, and
efficient enforcement in the digital economy may require expanded
intervention against indirect infringers. Of course, copyright
enforcement has to take into account other important issues, such as
the right of free speech, which are not present in our economic
analysis.
49. The Copyright Act limits the liability of search engines and online directories
under certain conditions; however, to benefit from this protection, they must block access
to infringing material. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
50. This example raises another reason in support of the proposition that allocating
property rights can affect the outcome even when bargaining is privately efficient. See
supra note 27. If movie companies and other supporters of CSS were to pay one party not
to produce and disseminate DeCSS or a similar program, other parties may be encouraged
to develop (or threaten to develop) similar programs solely to receive payments not to
release them to the public. This process would both waste resources and lower the returns
for creating works that would otherwise be protected by CSS.
51. See briefs cited supra note 47.
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Conclusion
Our aim here is modest one: to show that an important
dimension of copyright policy, namely the efficient locus of copyright
enforcement, is amenable to economic analysis. The discussion in this
Article scratches only the surface and is too shallow to serve as a basis
for policy conclusions. However, we believe this will prove to be both
a powerful and insightful approach.
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Figure 1
A Simple Value Chain for Consuming Copies
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